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Abstract
Roberto Gargarella surveys the landscape of Latin American Constitutionalism from 1810 to 2010, with particular emphasis on efforts in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries to enhance protections of multiculturalism and human rights. Gargarella begins by surveying the “founding
period” of Latin American constitutionalism, a period marked by compromise between liberals and conservatives. He proceeds to discuss the increasing incorporation of social rights—primarily economic and labor rights—
during the early twentieth century. Gargarella then discusses a final wave of
reforms, which introduced increasing human rights protections in the latter
half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. Gargarella concludes that the latest wave of reforms did not go far enough in
advancing human rights because the reforms failed to reach what Gargarella
calls the “engine room of the constitution.” The engine room consists of the
power-granting provisions of constitution that determine the relative authority of governmental actors. Gargarella contends that the enshrinement
of several additional rights in Latin American constitutions is undermined
by a failure to reorganize power structures so as to ensure that these new
rights will be enforced.

† Professor of Law, University of Torcuato Di Tella (Buenos Aires, Argentina). J.S.D and LL.M.,
University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Buenos Aires; B.A. and LL.B., University of Buenos Aires.
Researcher in constitutional theory and political philosophy.
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In this essay, I briefly review the history of Latin American constitutionalism
from 1810 to 2010. My major interest is the study of two of the main features
of the region’s constitutions, namely their exceptional commitment to social,
economic, and cultural rights, and their obstinate insistence on concentrated
models of political organization. My work is divided into four main parts. The
first refers to the “founding period” of Latin American constitutionalism; the
second examines the period of “social constitutionalism” that emerged in the
first part of the twentieth century; and the third studies the last wave of constitutional reforms that began at the end of the twentieth century. I end this essay
with some conclusions concerning what these constitutions achieved and what
they did not.
I Liberal-Conservative Constitutions (1850–1910)
Most Latin American countries entered the twentieth century with liberal-conservative constitutions—this is to say constitutions that were the result of a political compact between liberals and conservatives.1 Most of these agreements were
signed in the second half of the nineteenth century, at a time when liberalism and
conservatism represented the two main political forces in the region.2 Their constitutional compact, however, was unexpected, given that the two groups had
appeared as fierce political enemies during the first half of the century.3 The
fact is that after years of severe disputes, the two rival political factions began to
join forces and forge an alliance that would remain intact during the following
decades.4
The constitutions that liberals and conservatives created during those years
appeared as imperfect syntheses of the legal aspirations of the two groups. More
specifically, these new constitutions reflected, on the one hand, the commitment
to a system of checks and balances and to state neutrality—mainly religious
tolerance—that characterized the aspirations of the liberal group. On the other
hand the constitutions represented, the commitment to a system of concentrated
authority—regional centralization and moral perfectionism—that characterized
the aspirations of the conservative group. The new constitutions, one could
1

Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism 1810–2010, at 34–53 (2013).
Id.
3 We may recall, in this respect, the brutal way in which Chilean conservatives treated their
opponents since the beginning of the Conservative Republic in 1833; the bloody confrontations
between unitarios and federales in Argentina; the Federal War in Venezuela, which also divided
liberals and conservatives; the cruel confrontation between the two groups in Colombia, which
included episodes of civil war; and the battle of the Mexican liberals puros in Mexico against the
forces of the conservative Santanistas. I reviewed some of these events in my 2010 publication. See
Roberto Gargarella, The Legal Foundations of Inequality: Constitutionalism in the
Americas, 1776–1860 (2010).
4 Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century, we begin to see liberals and conservatives coming together, politically speaking. Among many other examples are the 1853 Constitution in Argentina,
the Mexican Constitution of 1857, and the 1886 Constitution in Colombia, which were written by
representatives of both the liberal and conservative groups. Another interesting case of convergence
between these two forces appears in the liberal-conservative “fusion” in Chile (1857–1873); and
there are other similar examples in Venezuela and Peru. See Gargarella, supra note 1, at 34–53.
2
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claim, represented a combination of the United States Constitution, which was
at the time very influential among liberals, and the 1833 Chilean Constitution,
which represented the most influential conservative constitution during the nineteenth century.5
Synthetically speaking, these were constitutions that established religious tolerance without necessarily affirming state neutrality;6 defined a system of checks
and balances, which was, however, partly unbalanced in favor of the president;7
and established a center-federalist model of territorial organization.8
In addition, the liberal-conservative constitutions rejected the incorporation
of social clauses favoring the disadvantaged, and political initiatives favoring
mass participation in the public sphere. That is to say, the liberal-conservative
compact was also an exclusionary compact that implied the displacement of
most of the institutional initiatives that radical groups—frequently inspired by
Anglo-American radicals and the example of the French Revolution—had then
proposed.9 During all those years, in fact, radical groups advanced numerous
constitutional proposals, which included annual elections, the right to recall,
mandatory rotation, and mandatory instructions.10 In addition, radical groups
promoted different reforms aimed at addressing the “social question.” However, the triumph of the liberal-conservative project implicitly rebuffed all those
initiatives.
5 Juan Bautista Alberdi, Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de
la República Argentina [Bases and Starting Points for the Political Organization of
the Argentine Republic] (Linguka Ediciones ed., 2003) (1852).
6 Most of the new constitutions resisted conservative pressures in favor of establishing a particular religion, and replaced that requirement with some alternative formula. On some occasions,
like in Argentina, the liberal-conservative constitution reserved a special place for the dominant
Catholic faith (Art. 2 of the constitution, which ambiguously maintained that the state “supports”
the Catholic religion), while at the same time affirming religious tolerance (Art. 14). Art. 2, 14
Constitución Nacional [Const. Nac.] (Arg.). On other occasions, as in Mexico in 1857, or in
Ecuador in 1906, the constitution remained silent on the subject, which was a way of affirming the
impossibility of either group consecrating its own viewpoint on the subject. In Chile, the strongly
religious profile of the 1833 Constitution was moderated after some decades, when an interpretative
law (from 1865) opened room for (relative) religious tolerance. See Gargarella, supra note 3.
7 Most of the liberal-conservative constitutions favored the traditional system of a division of
power accompanied by a system of checks and balances, in line with the U.S. constitutional model.
However, as a consequence of the conservatives’ pressure, the new Latin American constitutions
introduced some significant changes with regard to the inspiring example of the United States. Typically, they created too powerful an executive power, which challenged the structure of equilibriums
that then characterized the traditional system of checks and balances. See Carlos Santiago Nino,
Fundamentos de derecho constitucional: análisis filosófico, jurídico y politológico
de la práctica constitucional [Foundations of Constitutional Law: Philosophical, Legal, and Political Science Analysis of Constitutional Practice] (1992).
8 The liberal-conservative constitutions emerged after a violent period of disputes between centralist and federalist groups. This is why, in most cases, these constitutions did not want to consecrate
either a purely centralist or federalist territorial organization of the country. What they tended to
do instead was to adopt mixed or more ambiguous solutions in this respect. See Gargarella, supra
note 1, at 30–33.
9 See Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (1991).
10 Id. See also Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787
(1969).
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II Social Constitutionalism (1910–1950)
The liberal-conservative constitutional compact was enormously successful in
the establishment of regimes of “order and progress.”11 This was particularly
so from the 1880s, when most countries in the region began to massively export
primary goods, and Latin America enjoyed an exceptional period of economic
prosperity and political stability.12
Things began to change, however, with the arrival of the new century. These
changes came for different reasons, including a growing and increasingly mobilized working class, and a rising discomfort with levels of inequality and authoritarianism that distinguished the decades of “order and progress.”13
The first, and extremely radical, sign of alarm appeared with the 1910 Mexican Revolution. The Revolution, as we know, had a quite spectacular constitutional outcome, namely the 1917 constitution. This constitution was exceptionally long, robust in its declaration of rights, and strongly committed to social
rights.14 It was, at the time, a complete novelty. In fact, the Mexican Constitution became a pioneer for the entire world in the development of social constitutionalism. Among many other clauses, the Mexican Constitution included
Article 27, which declared that the ownership of the lands and waters within
the boundaries of the national territory was “vested originally in the Nation.”15
Article 123 incorporated wide protections for workers, recognized the role of
trade unions, and regulated labor relations, reaching very detailed issues.16 In
a way, Article 123 covered most of the topics would later distinguish modern
labor law. This article made reference, for example, to the maximum duration
of work, the use of labor of minors, the rights of pregnant women, the minimum
wage, the right to vacation, the right to equal wages, comfortable and hygienic
conditions of labor, labor accidents, the right to strike and lockout, arbitration,
dismissal without cause, social security, and right of association.
The 1917 Mexican Constitution decisively changed the history of Latin American constitutionalism. Following its adoption, little by little, most countries in
the region began to change their basic constitutional structures. In fact, following Mexico’s early example, most countries started to include long lists of social
rights in their constitutions: Brazil modified its constitution in 1937; Bolivia in
1938; Cuba in 1940; Uruguay in 1942; Ecuador and Guatemala in 1945; and
Argentina and Costa Rica in 1949.17 This was the way in which Latin American
11 This was the motto of “positivism,” that is to say the political ideology that prevailed during
the early twentieth century. See Leopoldo Zea, The Latin American Mind 26 (James H. Abbott
& Lowell Dunham trans., 1963).
12 See Tulio Halperín Donghi, The Aftermath of Revolution in Latin America
(Josephine de Bunsen trans., 1973).
13 See Tulio Halperín Donghi, Historia contemporánea de América latina [Contemporary History of Latin America] (1985).
14 See Jorge Sayeg Helú, 2 El constitucionalismo social mexicano: la integración
constitucional de México: (1808–1988) [Mexican Social Constitutionalism: The Constitutional Integration of Mexico: (1808–1988)] 319–383 (2d ed. 1987).
15 Id. at 328.
16 Id. at 377–380.
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constitutions expressed, through the use of the legal language, the main social
changes that had taken place in the region during the first half of the twentieth
century, namely the incorporation of the working class as a decisive political
and economic actor.
III Multiculturalism and Human Rights (1950–2010)
After this first wave of reforms, the region underwent a second period of constitutional change, which was fundamentally concentrated between the end of
the 1980s and 2000. In this new epoch, Brazil changed its constitution in 1988,
Colombia in 1991, Argentina in 1994, Venezuela in 1999, Ecuador in 2008,
Bolivia in 2009, and Mexico in 2011.
Most of these new legal documents were impacted, in one way or another, by
two grim events. The first event was political: the emergence of a new wave of
dictatorships that affected the region—notably, the 1973 military coup against
Salvador Allende in Chile. The second event was economic: the adoption of neoliberal reforms and programs of economic adjustment at the end of the 1980s.18
The period of military governments had a profound effect on the region at
different levels. First of all, it obliged some countries, after the recovery of
democracy, to substantively reconstruct their constitutional organization. This
was, for example, the case of Chile, as a consequence of the numerous authoritarian enclaves left by General Pinochet’s 1980 constitution.19 This was also
the case in Brazil, which had to confront the 1967 constitution, enacted during
the military government of General Humberto Castelo Branco. Among other
things, the 1967 constitution (amended in 1969) imposed severe limitations on
the federal organization of the country, as well as the political and civil liberties
of the population.20
17

Gargarella, supra note 1, at 105–148.
See Robert Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and
the 1980 Constitution (2002); Marco Antonio Villa, A História das Constituições Brasileiras [The History of the Brazilian Constitutions] (2012); Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice
Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics (2011); Carlos
Acuña & Catalina Smulovitz, Adjusting the Armed Forces to Democracy: Successes, Failures and
Ambiguities in the Southern Cone, in Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship
and Society in Latin America (Elizabeth Jelin & Eric Herschberg eds., 1996).
19 Those enclaves included the institutions of life-tenured senators (which allowed Pinochet to
be part of the Senate during the democratic period) and of “designated senators” (which allowed
members of the coercive forces to be part of the Senate), a National Security Congress, an extremely
exclusionary electoral system (which made it very difficult for minority forces to participate in electoral politics), and the requirement of qualified majorities in order to change basic aspects of the institutional system (such as education, the organization of congress, and the regulation of the army).
See Barros, supra note 18.
20 Large meetings were subject to previous governmental authorization; political parties were
restricted (only the official party, namely the National Renovating Alliance [ARENA], and an opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement [MDB] were allowed to function as such); and
direct suffrage was directly suppressed in the main cities for security reasons.
In 1969, a provisional military junta introduced a profound amendment of the constitution, which
strengthened the repressive character of the previous document. For example, it introduced the
institution of the death penalty, suppressed habeas corpus, created new military courts, and opened
18
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The end of this ruthless era of dictatorships came with other rights-based
constitutional reforms. These changes implied giving special, sometimes constitutional, status to different human rights treaties that the countries had signed
during the previous four or five decades. These treaties were designed to protect
the same basic human rights that had been systematically violated by dictatorial
governments.21 Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, and El
Salvador were among the many countries that tried to ensure more protections
for the rights affected by the recent authoritarian governments.22
The decision to provide special legal status to diverse human rights treaties
created interesting results. In part, these initiatives expressed the reconciliation
of certain parts of the political left with issues of rights and constitutionalism,
which the left had frequently resisted. In addition, the new legal status given to
human rights by many of these constitutions had an interesting effect on conservatives. For instance, after these constitutional changes, many conservative
judges began to consider more seriously arguments based on the value of human
rights.23
The other fundamental constitutional change produced in the region, by the
end of the twentieth century, came as a consequence of the application of socalled programs of structural adjustment. By structural adjustment programs, I
mean the harsh economic policies applied in the region during the 1980s, usually
by democratic, post-dictatorial governments. These were monetary policies that
usually implied a drastic reduction of public expenditures and the elimination of
social programs. These adjustment programs were originally promoted in Great
Britain under the direction of Margaret Thatcher and in the United States during
the administration of Ronald Reagan.24
The impact of these policies of structural adjustment on constitutionalism
was enormous. More directly, the launch of these programs usually required
the introduction of legal and even constitutional changes directed at facilitating
the application of economic initiatives.25 Also—and more significant for our
the door to new repressive laws—such as the Law of National Security, or a law regulating the press.
See Villa, supra note 18.
21 See Sikkink, supra note 18; Acuña & Smulovitz, supra note 18.
22 See Gabriel L. Negretto, Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties & Institutional
Choice in Latin America (2013).
23 See Carlos Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (1996).
24 See Sebastián Etchemendy, Models of Economic Liberalization: Business, Workers,
and Compensation in Latin America, Spain, and Portugal 300–315 (2011). See also El asedio
a la política: Los partidos latinoamericanos en la era neoliberal [The Siege on Politics:
Latin American Parties in the Neoliberal Era] (Marcelo Cavarozzi & Juan Manuel Abal
Medina eds., 2005).
25 In this respect we can mention, for example, the thirty-five amendments to the 1988 Brazilian
Constitution that were promoted by former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (amendments
that came to facilitate the privatization process); the reform of Article 58 in the Colombian Constitution of 1991 (which was promoted by the conservative government of Andrés Pastrana, in order
to provide more guarantees to foreign investment); the modification of Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution (which came to put limits to initiatives for the distribution of land); the Peruvian constitutional reform in 1993 (which was advanced by President Fujimori—after his auto-golpe—and
directed at eliminating many of the social commitments assumed by the 1979 Constitution); and the
guarantees given to the value of the money in Argentina through the constitutional reform elabo-
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present purposes—the economic changes of the era provoked an economic and
social crisis that drove the introduction of new legal reforms. In effect, the neoliberal programs provoked social distress and growing levels of unemployment
that were not compensated for by the existence of a solid safety net. As a consequence, millions of people suddenly found themselves in a situation of complete
abandonment, without the means to ensure their own subsistence and the subsistence of their families.26 The state, which for the previous forty years had
guaranteed work and social protections for vast sectors of the population, was
now shrinking.27 Many of its most valuable assets were sold in non-transparent
and hasty transactions.28 As a consequence, Latin America began to experience
a process of social mobilization demanding the social protections that many constitutions still promised.
Social protests and counter-institutional uprisings exploded in the entire region, from the south to the north, east to west. They included, for example,
the insurrection of the Zapatistas of the EZLN in Mexico (which began in January 1994, one year after Mexico’s signature of its free trade agreement with the
United States); but also the “wars” of “water” (2000) and “gas” (2003) in Bolivia, directed against the privatization of basic sections of the national economy;
the occupations of land promoted by the Landless Movement (MST) in Brazil;
the taking of lands in Santiago, Chile; the “invasions” of property in Lima, Peru;
the emergence of the piqueteros movement in Argentina; and also numerous acts
of violence against the exploitation of mineral resources in different parts of the
region.29
Not surprisingly, some of the most relevant socio-legal reforms of the last
few decades—including those of Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and
Mexico—followed the economic crises of the 1990s.30 The new constitutional
changes can be read as a direct response to the social crisis of the previous years.
Thus, by the end of the century, most countries in the region had adopted extremely strong constitutions, at least with regards to the social, economic, and
cultural rights that they included. A first look at the prevalent organization of
these constitutions’ bills of rights allows us to recognize the dimension of this
rated upon by Carlos Menem. See Gerardo Pisarello, Un Largo Termidor: Historia y crítica
del constitucionalismo antidemocrático [A Long Thermidor: History and Criticism of
Antidemocratic Constitutionalism] 186–87 (2011). Similarly, one could mention the many
different initiatives for judicial reform promoted by the World Bank and other financial multilateral
institutions during the 1980s, which were mainly directed at providing a more stable framework
to the new types of economic transactions that dominated the period. The Rule of Law in Latin
America: The International Promotion of Judicial Reform 1–3 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel
Sieder eds., 2011).
26 See Nino, supra note 7.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 For an overview, see Maristella Svampa, Cambio de época: Movimientos sociales y poder político [Changing Times: Social Movements and Political Power] (2008). See also Minería transnacional, narrativas del desarrollo y resistencias sociales [Transnational
Mining, Narratives of Development and Social Resistance] (Maristella Svampa & Mirta
Alejandra Antonelli eds., 2009).
30 See Pisarello, supra note 25.
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phenomenon. Present Latin American constitutions guarantee the protection
of the environment, culture, health, education, food, housing, work, clothing,
etc.31 In addition, some of the new or reformed constitutions included guarantees for gender equality, incorporated mechanisms of participatory democracy,
created the institution of referendum or popular consultation, introduced the
right to recall, or recognized the right to affirmative action.32 Still more notably, many of the renewed constitutional documents affirmed the existence of
a pluri- or multi-cultural state or national identity, provided special protection
to indigenous groups, and established the duty of mandatory consultation with
indigenous communities before the development of economic projects that could
affect their communal organizations.33
IV The “Engine Room” of the Constitution
Examples such as those reviewed above demonstrate not only the importance,
but also the limitations of the tasks of constitutional reform. Legal reformers
could not or did not want to go far enough to ensure that the reformed constitutions achieved the transformative characters that they proclaimed. To state
this does not deny the value of what has been achieved in the region, in constitutional terms, in recent years. Many of these reform processes managed to
advance the interests of the most disadvantaged, at least in theory. Better than
that, the practice of these constitutions showed that the changes introduced in
the sections regarding rights were far from innocuous. In the last few years
(although—and this is a problem—only in the last few years), the Latin American countries that had adopted more socially robust constitutions developed an
interesting and imaginative practice of judicial enforcement of social rights.34
However, it also seems clear that these reforms were, in the best case, very
limited in their scope and achievements. One of the main reasons that explain
this conclusion is the fact that the reformers seemed to have concentrated their
energies in the section of rights, without taking into account the impact that the
organization of power tends to have upon those very rights that were then (extra)
protected. Notably, legal reformers dedicated most of their work to the creation
of new rights, leaving the organization of powers basically untouched. By acting
in this way, legal reforms kept the doors of the “engine room” of the constitution
31 Roberto Gargarella, Recientes reformas constitucionales en América Latina: una primera
aproximación [Recent Constitutional Reforms in Latin America: An Initial Approximation], 36
Desarrollo Económico 971 (1997).
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See, e.g., Manuel José Cepeda-Espinosa, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The Origin,
Role, and Impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 529
(2004); Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice
for the Poor? (Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo & Theunis Roux eds., 2006); Courting
Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing
World (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008); Bruce B. Wilson, Changing Dynamics: The
Political Impact of Costa Rica’s Constitutional Court, in The Judicialization of Politics in Latin
America 47 (Alan Angell, Line Schjolden & Rachel Sieder eds., 2005).
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closed: the core of the democratic machinery was not changed. The engine of
the constitution did not become the main object of the reformers’ attention. It
was as if their mission concluded with their work on the rights-section, as if the
main controls could only be touched by the closest allies of those in power.
It is interesting to contrast this remarkable omission, typical of recent reformers, with what their old intercessors used to do when engaged in a process
of constitutional change. For example, the engineers of the liberal-conservative
compact showed no doubts about what they were required to do in order to ensure the life of their most cherished rights—say, basically, the right to property.
For them, it seemed totally clear that in order to guarantee protections to, say,
the right to property, the first thing to do was to get into the “engine room”
and introduce some necessary modifications first. Typically, they proposed the
restriction of political liberties in order to ensure the enjoyment of broader economic freedoms. This was, for example, Juan B. Alberdi’s main constitutional
lesson for his time: it was necessary to temporarily tie the hands of the majority,
so as to ensure protection for certain basic economic rights.35 The “mistake” of
recent reformers also contrasts with what old radicals used to do when engaged
in processes of constitutional change. Radicals concentrated all their energies in
producing certain basic political and economic changes (typically, an agrarian
reform, a government by assemblies) through the political mobilization of the
masses. In so doing, they never subscribed to the (conservative) model of concentrated authority (as contemporary radicals tend to do), and they never spoke
the liberal language of rights (as contemporary radicals usually do).
Of course, the problem with the new constitutions is not simply that they
did not go far enough so as to reach the “engine room” of the constitution. If
that were the problem, the solution could have simply been to wait until the
next reform. The problem is that, by preserving an organization of powers that
is still arranged under the nineteenth century model of concentrated authority,
the new constitutions put at risk the same initiatives that they advanced through
the rights sections.36 Thus organized, the new constitutions tend to present a
contradictory design: they look democratically and socially committed in their
section of rights, while at the same time they seem to reject those same socialdemocratic ideals through their traditionally vertical political organization. Not
surprisingly, and as a consequence, the old hyper-presidentialist political organization has tended to block all the initiatives directed at setting in motion the
initiatives for popular empowerment included in the new constitutions. For example, Argentina’s political authorities refused to implement the participatory
clauses incorporated in the 1994 constitution;37 Ecuador’s president systematically vetoed all of the initiatives directed at enforcing the newly created mechanisms for popular participation.38 In Peru, Chile, Mexico, and Ecuador, in35

Juan Bautista Alberdi, Obras Selectas (Joaquín V. González ed., 1920).
Carlos Santiago Nino, Hyperpresidentialism and Constitutional Reform in Argentina, in Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America 161 (Arend
Lijphart & Carlos H. Waisman eds., 1996).
37 Gargarella, supra note 1, at 174.
38 See Julio Echeverría, El Estado en la nueva Constitución [The State in the New Constitution],
36
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digenous leaders suffered prison or repression every time they wanted to put in
practice their newly acquired rights.39
The “mistake” committed by those who wanted to promote social reforms
with the help of the constitution, but without effectively touching the “engine
room” of the document, appears clearly in an extraordinary piece of self-criticism written by Arturo Sampay. It is important to note that Sampay was the
main (Peronist) jurist who contributed to the drafting of the 1949 Argentine
constitution, during the government of General Perón. That constitution, we
know, incorporated a profound social commitment manifested in a long and
innovative list of social rights. However, in an article that Sampay published
some years later, the jurist challenged part of his previous initiatives. This is
what he said:
The Constitutional reform of 1949 was not properly conducive to
the predominance of the people, by favoring the exercise of political power by the popular sectors. This was due, first, to the faith
that the triumphant popular sectors had in the charismatic leadership of Perón. Secondly, this was due to the same vigilant attitude of
Perón, who made everything possible to prevent the popular sectors
to achieve an actual power that could impair the power of the legal
government. These facts helped the government to stay in power
until the time that the oligarchical sectors, in accordance with the
armed forces, decided to put an end to his government. That was,
then the Achilles heel of the reform. And this explains why the Constitution died, like Achilles, died at an early stage, by his enemy: it
was vulnerable precisely in the most significant part, this is to say in
that part that had to provide for its support.40
With unusual virtue, Sampay recognized the fatal mistake that he and other
members of his generation committed, by not paying sufficient attention to what
he himself described as the “Achilles heel” of the constitution.41 Social reformers should take Sampay’s lesson to heart. The new constitutions need to make
consistent the organization of powers with the new social impulses that they incorporated through the bills of rights sections of the documents. In other words,
in order to introduce social changes in the constitution, one needs to primarily
affect an organization of power that was designed for old, elitist nineteenth century societies.

in La nueva Constitución del Ecuador (Santiago Andrade Ubidia, Agustín Grijalva & Claudia
Storini eds., 2009).
39 See Minería transnacional, narrativas del desarrollo y resistencias sociales, supra
note 29.
40 Arturo Enrique Sampay, Constitución y pueblo 122 (1973) (my translation).
41 Id.

